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Monotheism and its Vicissitudes
K. Daniel Cho

Abstract Challenging the claim that monotheism is intolerant,
the author presents an original interpretation of Sigmund Freud’s
last book Moses and Monotheism. Freud is shown offering a theory
of monotheism in which monotheism is not seen as exclusive, but
rather as inherently equivocal.

1
Is monotheism intolerant? It would certainly seem so, if the media
is any indication. Whenever the media reports on monotheism these
days—whether it is a story about Christian conservatives fighting
same-sex marriage legislation, a suicide bomber detonating an explosive in the name of Islam, or an Orthodox Jew censoring women’s
speech—it always seems it is because monotheism has reached a new
low in intolerance. Of course, critics of monotheism will argue that
there is nothing accidental about this inclination toward intolerance.1
Monotheisms, they will point out, understand themselves to have an
exclusive claim on the truth, a claim to which intolerance is integral
and inevitable, for if a religion (or any system of thought, for that matter) understands itself to be the one and only truth, then it must, by
necessity, reject, be intolerant of, all other accounts of the spiritual, the
divine, and indeed the world itself, as so many falsehoods. Perhaps,
monotheisms wouldn’t be so problematic if this exclusive understanding of the truth (and of themselves) was purely a theoretical matter,
but this is never the case. As the critics will argue, the exclusive understanding of the truth always finds its way to the world of practice,
where it draws distinctions between peoples, practices, and cultures,
holding one side up as normative and the other as aberrant. Indeed,
as the critics will point out, it is from these practical distinctions that
monotheistic truth draws its very meaning and power.2 Perhaps, such
distinctions were useful once upon a time when religions served as
the common framework that knit disparate peoples and populations
together into a single society, but now they are completely useless—or,
worse than useless, dangerous and destructive. Relics of a bygone era,
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monotheisms no longer have any place in a modern liberal society—or
perhaps, even stronger, they are the very bane of that society—and
therefore should be relegated to the dustbin of history. Or, so the critics
claim.
If this were all there was to say about monotheism—if monotheism has become (or always has been) truly nothing more than a system
of intolerance—then there would be no other recourse than to join the
critics in their call for the end of monotheism (or indeed religion itself).
But, I suspect, not everything has been said concerning monotheism.
Certainly, intolerance is part of monotheism’s story (an unfortunate
part, to be sure), but it is not the whole story. There is, I want to claim,
something more to monotheism, another part to the story that has yet
to be told, which is worth pursuing. To make that pursuit, I want to
turn to Sigmund Freud’s last and most fascinating book, Moses and
Monotheism, for it is in this strange book that Freud comes to a most relevant insight concerning monotheism, namely, that monotheism cannot be all intolerant because monotheism is not all: that is, monotheism
is not a single univocal thing, but rather something dual or equivocal.
Before going any further into this insight of Freud’s, I want to
say a few words about the strangeness of the book itself. Moses and
Monotheism is an odd book indeed. Freud began working on Moses and
Monotheism in 1934, under a completely different title (The Man Moses,
A Historical Novel). Dissatisfied with that book, Freud decided against
publishing it. Yet he did not abandon the project altogether, but instead
continued working on his Moses book over the next five years, under
the growing shadow of Nazism, until finally publishing it (without
any reference to fiction in its title) in 1939. In its final, published form,
the book is comprised of three essays—the third of which is well over
twice the length of the first two essays combined, begins with two prefaces and is interrupted halfway through by a third preface. Between
the three parts of the book, there are numerous discrepancies—repetitions, gaps, omissions—discrepancies that have led some to consider
Moses a mere eccentricity. The real stumbling block for most, however,
are the preposterous, even offensive, propositions that Freud puts forward in its pages, the best known example of which is the infamous
claim that the Jews had in fact murdered their leader, Moses.
A truly odd and problematic book, it is no wonder some simply
dismiss Moses as a bizarre fantasy, a case of wild analysis, not to be
taken as a serious commentary on the nature of monotheism. But I
will caution against adopting such a reactionary—or, more accurately,
defensive—posture, as it seems to me, keenly ironic that one would
use fantasy as the pretext for rejecting a psychoanalytic interpretation
of anything, much less monotheism.3 Indeed, as Freud himself argues,
in Moses, an idea (whether it comes in the form of a memory, an analysand’s speech, or a book) need not be grounded in empirical fact to
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produce insights into the nature of a thing. Or, using Freud’s own
words, there is a difference between “material truth” and “historical
truth,”4 and insofar as Moses does not correspond with the material
truth, “it may be described as a delusion,” but insofar as it makes us
attentive to something in monotheism of which we were previously
unaware, “it must be called the truth.”5 Indeed, as I will argue below, it
is precisely in the errors and discrepancies—in the very fantastical elements themselves—that Moses produces its insights. And if we attend
to these Enstellungen or distortions, as Freud calls them (rather than
use them to disqualify Moses), I believe we will find a fresh way of
thinking and speaking about monotheism.
Towards this end, let me begin with a simple observation, one that
anyone who has read Moses and Monotheism will no doubt have made:
namely, that the number two recurs throughout Freud’s book. There
is the idea that two groups of people came together to form the Jews,
the idea that two documentary sources (the so-called J and E texts)
inform the Bible, and of course the wild idea that there were not one,
but two Moseses.6 From this observation, it is not difficult to reach the
conclusion that Freud’s key insight in Moses is the presence of duality
or equivocity in monotheism as such. That is to say, Freud does not
deny that monotheism indeed has a tendency to become entangled
with intolerance and exclusivity, but he also asserts that these logics
do not comprise all there is to monotheism, that something of monotheism somehow always eludes their capture—or, as I put it moments
ago, that monotheism is not one, but two. The task of this paper will
then be to demonstrate how Freud brings equivocity out of monotheism, but for now, I only want to illustrate the form of Freud’s thinking
by turning to what is something of a sideline in his account: namely,
Christian anti-Semitism.
After presenting Paul and Christianity as simultaneously a renewal
and a departure from Judaism, Freud turns his attention to the topic of
Christian anti-Semitism. The primary reason Christians hate the Jews,
Freud claims, is that the Jews refuse to admit to having killed the primal father while Christians readily do so. But something as insidious
as anti-Semitism, Freud suggests, must have “more than one ground,”7
and so, he gives five additional sources for it. The first four sources
are: the Jews’ status as permanent aliens, their unassimilable otherness, their claim to being “the first-born, favourite child of God,”8 and
the practice of circumcision. What all four of these sources or grounds
have in common is that they have to do with the attitudes or beliefs
of individual Christians. They resent the Jews’ otherness and find circumcision uncannily reminiscent of castration, for example. The fifth
and final ground Freud gives, however, is different. It differs because
it does not attempt to “read the minds” of individual Christians, but
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rather calls into question the very category of Christian itself. He
writes: “we must not forget that all those peoples who excel to-day in
their hatred of Jews became Christians only in late historic times, often
driven to it by bloody coercion.”9 They are, in Freud’s words, “misbaptized,” only possessing “a thin veneer of Christianity.”10 As such,
their hatred of the Jews is in actuality a displaced hatred of Christians
themselves for having forced Christianity upon them: “They have not
got over a grudge against the new religion which was imposed on
them; but they have displaced the grudge on to the source from which
Christianity reached them.”11
Many understand Freud to be a harsh critic of Christianity, and
so the fact that he pursues the topic of Christian anti-Semitism, even
at the cost of deviating from the mainline of his book, is not too surprising. In the same way, the first four sources that Freud finds are not
unusual. However, the fifth reason—that is, that Christian anti-Semites are Christians “misbaptized”—stands out, as it runs completely
counter to this standard image of Freud as a critic of Christianity. By
clarifying that Christian anti-Semites only possess “a thin veneer of
Christianity,” that they hold the mantle of Christianity wrongly, Freud
actually defends Christianity by distinguishing between the Christianity
of the anti-Semites and Christianity as such. That is to say, rather than
use anti-Semitism to eschew Christianity altogether (as contemporary
critics of monotheism are wont to do), Freud provocatively insists on
a difference within Christianity, between Christianity “misbaptized”
and Christianity as such. Because of this difference, or this twoness, it
becomes possible to challenge Christian anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism
attempts to draw a distinction between Christians and Jews, which
Freud wants to dismantle. However, he does not disrupt the ChristianJew distinction of anti-Semitism by employing either of the tactics that
we have come to expect in today’s critical literature: that is, either by
introducing an external counter-force (such as secularism) or by simply “deconstructing” that boundary. Rather, he does so, in a highly
original and indeed paradoxical, if not ironic, fashion by introducing
equivocity within Christianity itself. The Christian-Jew distinction
of anti-Semitism can never be so stable because Christianity is never
quite itself. Because of this twoness—call it a constitutive equivocity—Christianity finds itself on both sides of the border of anti-Semitism, as both the subject of anti-Semitism as well as, paradoxically, its
object, which enables Freud to find the possibility of solidarity where
anti-Semitism only saw division: “Their hatred of Jews is at bottom a
hatred of Christians, and we need not be surprised that in the German
National-Socialist revolution this intimate relation between the two
monotheist religions finds such a clear expression in the hostile treatment of both of them.”12
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2
The idea of equivocity appears in Moses and Monotheism most explicitly
in the form of a break between Akhenaten and Moses. Now, this claim
will appear controversial as it goes against the way Freud’s text has
been traditionally understood. Traditionally, Freud has been understood as attempting to establish continuity between these two figures.
For instance, Freud very clearly claims that Moses was an Egyptian, “a
member of the royal house” and as such “close to the Pharaoh” and “a
convinced adherent of the new religion, whose basic thoughts he had
made his own.”13 So, how could someone of such description be said
to have broken off with Akhenaten?
To answer this question, I want to take a closer look, not only at
the way Freud describes Moses and Akhenaten’s relationship itself,
but at how he describes their respective monotheisms as well. Or, to
put it more precisely, I want to look at the incongruity between the way
Freud characterizes these two men’s relationship, on one hand, and
their respective monotheistic projects, on the other. For while Freud
does indeed describe the two men as close, he also points to an important difference between the Aten religion and Judaism, which calls that
closeness into question. This difference has to do with the permissibility of idols and idolatry. Freud writes: “Jewish monotheism behaved in
some respects even more harshly than the Egyptian: for instance in forbidding pictorial representations of any kind.”14 This difference may
appear minor, but it has profound implications on how we understand
Moses and Akhenaten’s relationship.15
To better grasp the implications of this difference, consider the
context in which Freud evokes Akhenaten in the first place. Freud, as
is well known by now, wants to suggest that Judaism originated in
Egypt. But right away he recognizes a problem with this suggestion,
namely, “the fact of there being the most violent contrast between the
Jewish religion which is attributed to Moses and the religion of Egypt”:
“The former is a rigid monotheism on the grand scale” while the latter
features “an almost innumerable host of deities of varying dignity and
origin.”16 So obvious—or, in Freud’s words, “most violent”—is this
contrast that Freud even suspects it of being “deliberate” and “intentionally heightened.”17 Intentional or not, the dissimilarity between
Judaism and Egyptian polytheism makes the notion of an Egyptian
origin difficult to accept.
To make the idea of an Egyptian origin more plausible, Freud
must find a way to account for this violent contrast. It is at this point
that Freud turns to Akhenaten. Akhenaten was a follower of the Aten
religion, which was a sun-cult, but more importantly, a monotheism,
“the first attempt of the kind, so far as we know, in the history of the
world.”18 As a monotheism, the Aten religion offers a readymade
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explanation for how Judaism may have begun in Egypt. “This impression seems justified,” writes Freud, “if now, in making the comparison, we replace the Jewish religion by the Aten religion which, as we
know, was developed by Akhenaten in deliberate hostility to the popular one.”19 The Aten religion would explain, not only how Judaism
began in Egypt, but how it began there in contrast to polytheism. With
this explanation in hand, all Freud must do is establish a link between
Moses and Akhenaten.
But there is a problem with this explanation: namely, graven
images. Akhenaten, it is true, would explain what is perhaps the most
obvious difference between Judaism and polytheism—namely, the difference in the number of their respective deities—so it is quite understandable that Freud would want to bring Akhenaten into his account.
But number is not the only contrast between Judaism and Egyptian
polytheism that exists, nor is it, according to Freud himself, the most
significant. An even more fundamental difference than number exists
over the issue of graven images. Graven images in Judaism are, as it is
well known, strictly forbidden while in polytheism “they proliferate,”
as Freud puts it, “with the greatest luxuriance,” as if Egyptian polytheists possessed (or, perhaps, were possessed by) “the insatiable appetite…for embodying their gods in clay, stone and metal.”20 And while
the Aten religion differs with polytheism over number—thus serving
as a possible explanation for how Judaism, a monotheism, could have
grown up in the shadow of Egyptian polytheism—it remains absolutely indistinguishable from polytheism on the question of graven images, thus begging the question: if the Aten religion explains Judaism’s
difference with polytheism on the question of number, then what
explains Judaism’s difference with both polytheism and the Aten religion on the question of graven images?
Thus, a contradiction appears in Freud’s text. On one hand, Freud
presents Moses as a close disciple of Akhenaten. On the other hand, he
credits Moses with the prohibition on graven images, which suggests
Moses opposed Akhenaten. What to make of this contradiction? The
answer can be found in Freud himself. In his discussion of the myriad of errors and contradictions that supposedly can be found in the
Bible, Freud offers a method of interpretation that does not consider
such distortions or Entstellungen as evidence of the Bible’s unreliability,
but rather as so many clues that another, counter-narrative lies “suppressed and disavowed hidden away”21 beneath the surface of the official narrative.22 The task of the reader is then not to simply point out or
inventory all of the “noticeable gaps, disturbing repetitions and obvious contradictions”23 that can be found throughout the text, but rather
to use them to reconstruct that disavowed narrative, like a detective
reconstructing the scene of a crime from the clues that remain.
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The obvious point to be made here is that Freud’s theory of
Entstellung is not simply a Biblical hermeneutic, but a method for
reading the contradictions of any text, including indeed those of
Moses and Monotheism itself. That is to say, this contradiction in the
way Freud presents Moses—namely, the contradiction between Moses
as Akhenaten’s disciple and Moses as inventor of the ban on graven
images—should not be glossed over. But at the same time, it should
not be taken as a reason to reject his account as such. The point is,
rather, to take this contradiction as a clue that another narrative—a
counter-narrative—exists, “suppressed and disavowed hidden away”
within Freud’s own text. What then is this alternative narrative? Allow
me to offer the following possibility: let us retain Freud’s original idea
that Moses and Akhenaten were indeed close (after all, the point is not
to dismiss the traditional reading of this text, but to supplement it).24 In
that case, I will suggest that at some point Moses became ambivalent
towards his master and began to rebel against him and his religion.
Eventually, Moses made an official break from Akhenaten by establishing his own monotheism, in which he sought to “[outdo] the strictness of the Aten religion.”25 The centerpiece of Moses’s monotheism
was, of course, the ban on graven images, which was conceived as an
expressed rejection of Akhenaten and his representational (or, to use
Freud’s own word, sensual) theology.
What may have caused Moses to become estranged from
Akhenaten, one may wonder? To be sure, the suggestion that Moses
drifted away from his master is not in itself all too surprising—after
all, was it not Freud himself who taught us that a son will wish to
usurp his father? Freud also tells us that Moses was “ambitious and
energetic” with dreams “of one day being the leader of his people, of
becoming the kingdom’s ruler.”26 So, perhaps, Moses’s estrangement
from Akhenaten was simply inevitable.
I will, however, in the spirit of “the schoolmen and Talmudists,”27
offer one other possible motive for their estrangement, a possibility
that has the additional benefit of explaining why Moses’s rebellion
took the specific form of a new monotheism: namely, the possibility that Moses became disenchanted with the Aten religion itself. But
if that was the case—if Moses did in fact become disenchanted with
his master’s religion—then what precisely in the Aten religion drew
Moses’s dissatisfaction? Here, once again, Freud offers the clue. When
first introducing Akhenaten, Freud notes that the heretic king was not
himself responsible for inventing the notion of a universal God—“For
a considerable time,” he writes, “tendencies had been at work among
the priesthood of the sun temple at On (Heliopolis) in the direction of
developing the idea of a universal god.”28 Rather, he was responsible
for something else. As Freud explains: “He introduced something new,
which for the first time converted the doctrine of a universal god into
monotheism—the factor of exclusiveness.”29
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What was truly innovative in Akhenaten, what turned the Aten
religion into a genuine monotheism, according to Freud, was this
notion that truth could not stand side-by-side with other truths, that
truth was exclusive, which meant that all other religions or gods had
to now be rejected as so many falsehoods—or, as Freud puts it, “in
assessing the new doctrine a knowledge of its positive contents is not
enough: its negative side is almost equally important—a knowledge
of what it rejects.”30 In short, Akhenaten invented intolerance. That
is why Akhenaten’s rule became characterized by “harshness and
intolerance” and why throughout Egypt “temples were closed, divine
service forbidden, temple property confiscated”:31 he could not abide
the existence of alternative or rival accounts of the divine; they were
for him falsehoods, and as such, they had to be eliminated. I want to
suggest that it was precisely this exclusive or intolerant quality of the
Aten religion that caused Moses to break with Akhenaten. Perhaps,
when Moses saw the damage Akhenaten’s fanatical monotheism had
done to his beloved kingdom (a kingdom that, Freud tells us, Moses
dreamed of one day ruling), he took the decision to break with his
master. However, instead of abandoning monotheism as a lost cause,
Moses chose to leave Egypt with “a Semitic tribe which had immigrated into [Egypt] a few generations earlier”32 for the chance to reinvent
monotheism. Moses believed that instead of promoting intolerance,
divisiveness, and exclusivity, instead of promoting legalism and absolutism, monotheism, at its best, could promote “the idea of a single
deity embracing the whole world, who was not less all-loving than
all-powerful, who was averse to all ceremonial and magic and set
before men as their highest aim a life in truth and justice,”33 in the best
possible senses of those terms. But for monotheism to actualize this
potential, it would need a new starting point, and that new starting
point would be the prohibition on graven images.34
3
For some, the Mosaic ban on graven images, which is codified in the
second commandment of the Decalogue, may appear to be a rather
minor feature of Judaism, but, for Freud, “the compulsion to worship
a God whom one cannot see”35 is Judaism’s defining feature. As Freud
tells it, the ban put Moses on a very different trajectory than Akhenaten.
Rather than lead to ever increasing levels of intolerance and violence
toward nonbelievers, Freud argues that the ban on graven images initiated, what he calls, the advance of intellectuality, “a triumph of intellectuality over sensuality,”36 which “helped to check the brutality and the
tendency to violence which are apt to appear where the development
of muscular strength is the popular ideal.”37
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Though Freud is clear that the ban on graven images led to the
so-called advance of intellectuality, he is less clear on what the advance
of intellectuality actually was. Clearly, it was a transformation of some
sort—Freud describes it as “a permanent imprint”38 of character—
though a transformation of what precisely, remains unclear. Freud
also claims the advance resulted in, among other things, a “rejection
of magic and mysticism,” an appreciation for “the possession of the
truth,” “a high opinion of what is intellectual,” and a “stress on what
is moral”39—all traits that, according to Freud, made the Jews more
civilized and less violent. Freud also suggests that this advance led
to an “inclination to intellectual interests,” which gave the Jews a
kind of inner strength that “held the scattered people together” after
the Romans destroyed the Temple.40 But for all that is known about
its effects, the advance of intellectuality itself remains something of a
mystery.
This ambiguity has to do with the German word, Geistigkeit,
which James Strachey, the translator of the Standard Edition, renders
as intellectuality. “The obvious alternative,” Strachey writes, “would
be ‘spirituality’, but,” as he explains, “in English this arouses some
very different associations.”41 Adding another layer of complication is
the fact that Moses and Monotheism was translated into English once
before it appeared in the Standard Edition by Katherine Jones, and in
that edition, Jones translates Geistigkeit as spirituality without so much
as a note.42 Whatever “associations” Strachey fears readers will make
while reading a book about religion, Jones appears to invite. So, Der
Fortschritt in der Geistigkeit was either a transformation of the intellect
or it was a transformation of the spirit, and the translators do not seem
to agree as to which it is.
Without this consensus, Strachey advises that it would be best for
readers “to examine Freud’s own account of the concept” and “to form
one’s conclusions on that.”43 Richard Bernstein has done exactly that.
In his very important book The Legacy of Moses, Bernstein approaches the question of Geistigkeit by focusing on the contrast Freud draws
between it and sensuality or Sinnlichkeit. “‘Sinnlichkeit’,” Bernstein
writes, “is the standard German term for referring to the senses and to
what can be known by sensory perception.”44 Based on this contrast,
it seems that Freud is trying to draw a contrast “between the ‘lower’
form of knowledge that is grasped by the senses and a ‘higher’ form
of abstract intellectual (spiritual) knowledge,” which would put Freud
right in line with the tradition of German Idealism, which saw Judaism
as promoting “intellectuality over sensibility.”45 Based on Bernstein’s
study of the context, it would seem Strachey is quite justified in his
choice of translation (although Bernstein, for his part, cautions that the
English cannot fully convey “the power and dynamic quality of the
German”46).
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However, Bernstein is not the only scholar to have examined this
question. Yosef Yerulshami, in his landmark reappraisal of Moses and
Monotheism, Freud’s Moses, also looks at the translation of Geistigkeit,
and in his assessment, the word intellectuality is a poor choice of translation as it is “far too narrow and cerebral and, in the context of M.M.,
often anachronistic.”47 Thus when he cites the passage on the advance
of intellectuality, Yerulshami simply refuses to translate Geistigkeit, in
recognition of the way “the German word hovers between intellectuality and spirituality.”48
I will not attempt to determine whether intellectuality or spirituality is the proper rendering of Geistigkeit, as I am also quite content to
let the word continue hovering, to put it with Yerulshami, between its
different valences. Indeed, it is quite possible that we are not meant to
choose between these possible meanings, that Freud chose the word
Geistigkeit precisely because of its undecideable nature. In that case,
perhaps Freud wanted to speak to the various and disparate aspects
of our person (to our minds as well as to our spirits, as it were) in
order to reveal the false choices we often force ourselves to make when
we place priority on this or that aspect of our being. Indeed, it seems
to me quite possible that Freud chose the word Geistigkeit precisely
to introduce or draw attention to the equivocity that constitutes our
very subjectivity—that is, to put it more precisely, the equivocity that
the advance of intellectuality introduced into our subjectivity, thereby constituting it. However, I do not wish to speculate any further on
the spiritual or intellectual implications of Geistigkeit. Rather, I want to
draw attention to a dimension of Freud’s concept of Geistigkeit that has
been hitherto overlooked.
Strachey, Jones, Bernstein and Yerulshami may all disagree on
whether Geistigkeit is better translated as intellectuality or spirituality, but they all share the same assumption that at stake is a subjective
transformation of some type. The advance of intellectuality may have
been a transformation of the human mind or the human spirit—or
indeed both—but it is a transformation of the human subject nonetheless. And yet, if we pay close attention to Freud’s own explanation
of the advance, we will notice that Geistigkeit does not simply have a
subjective meaning, but an objective one as well.
In the section on “The Advance of Intellectuality,” Freud gives a
brief account of the origins of Geistigkeit. He writes, “Human beings,”
at some point in history, “found themselves obliged in general to recognise ‘intellectual [geistige]’ forces—forces, that is, which cannot be
grasped by the senses (particularly by the sight) which none the less
produce undoubted and indeed extremely powerful effects.”49 Notice
that here Geistigkeit is presented, not as an aspect of the human subject but of the material world itself. The natural world is not all physical or material—it possesses an element of intellectuality or, if you
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like, spirituality. The specific example Freud gives of this Geistigkeit
of the world is wind: “If we may rely upon the evidence of language,
it was movement of the air that provided the prototype of intellectuality [Geistigkeit], for intellect [Geist] derives its name from a breath
of wind.”50 It would be too limiting to imagine this Geistigkeit of the
world as a type of animism, as Freud indicates that wind is only an
example, if the prototypical example, of an entire “world of spirits
[Geisterreich]”51 that lies just beyond the reach of our senses. To make
my claim even stronger: what Freud is describing here should not be
imagined as having any correlation whatsoever with the human mind.
Freud is not, for example, describing the Geistigkeit of the world as some
kind of projection or stain that results when the human mind attempts
to comprehend the world. The Geistigkeit of the world should not be
understood in these correlative terms because Freud makes it quite
clear that the Geistigkeit of the world existed even before human beings
had the capacity for recognizing it and that its presence “obliged” us to
recognize it in the first place. Indeed, Freud goes even further, suggesting that it was our discovery of Geistigkeit in the world that led us to
discover the same quality in ourselves, and not the other way around:
“This too led to the discovery of the mind [Seele (soul)] as that of the
intellectual [geistigen] principle in individual human beings.”52
With this account of the advance of intellectuality in hand, it is
now clear why, in Freud’s account of monotheism, both the Egyptians
and the Jews first reject monotheism. When Freud writes, “The Jewish
people under Moses were just as little able to tolerate such a highly
spiritualized religion,”53 he should not be read in the weak sense as
suggesting that the Jews simply had a distaste for Mosaic monotheism;
he must be read in the much stronger sense as arguing that the Jews
(as well as the Egyptians) lacked the very subjective capacity (whether
that capacity is defined as intellectual or spiritual in quality) for grasping it. The Jews of course would eventually acquire Geistigkeit, which
would enable them to adopt Mosaic monotheism, albeit belatedly, but
that acquisition—or, to use Freud’s word, advance—could only happen as a result of a direct and repeated encounter with the Geistigkeit of
the world, an encounter that would always be too soon or premature.
This is then how I claim Freud’s notion of the advance of intellectuality must be understood: it was not simply an enlarging or enhancing
of the intellectual (or spiritual) capacity of human beings, as if human
beings always already possessed such a thing in the first place; but
rather, it was much more radically the transfer of Geistigkeit from the
objective world to the human subject as a result of a repeated encounter, and indeed a repeated traumatic encounter, with monotheism.
What does it mean to say that the material world possesses a spiritual aspect? The simplest approach to this question would be to read
Geistigkeit as a kind of idealism. In that case, Freud would be read as
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presenting this intellectuality as a kind of other worldly dimension,
inhabited by the spectral concomitants of material objects. In fact,
Freud appears to be describing exactly such a dimension when he
makes reference to a Geisterreich or a “world of spirits.”54 But what
such a reading would miss is Freud’s insistence that this spirituality of the world, while immaterial (and therefore “cannot be grasped
by the senses (particularly by the sight)”55), is nonetheless real insofar
as it produces “extremely powerful effects”56 in the material world.
As such, we do not accurately grasp Freud’s Geistigkeit if we think
of it purely in terms of philosophical idealism, as if it were a kind of
Freudian variation on Plato’s forms. Rather, Freud’s Geistigkeit names
that aspect of the material world that is part of the material world but
is itself paradoxically immaterial. Or, to put it another way, Geistigkeit is
that part of the world that subtracts itself from materiality, that decompletes it, makes it not all.
4
In his discussion of Freud, in The Price of Monotheism, Jan Assmann
begins with a retraction. In his earlier work, Assmann viewed Freud as
a critic of monotheism, even going so far as to call him its “most outspoken destroyer.”57 Assmann held this view because he saw Freud’s
Egyptian hypothesis as a direct attack on the true-false distinction,
which Assmann takes to be the defining feature of monotheism: “What
seems crucial to me,” Assmann writes, “is not the distinction between
the One God and many gods but the distinction between truth and
falsehood in religion.”58 “Moses the Egyptian,” the early Assmann
argued, blurs the distinction between Israel and Egypt, thereby weakening the links between Israel and truth, on the one hand, and Egypt
and falsehood, on the other, as Moses “embodies what is imagined to
be common to Ancient Egypt and Israel.”59
In The Price of Monotheism, Assmann reverses directions, claiming
now that Freud was in fact attempting to present the true-false distinction “as a seminal, immensely valuable, and profoundly Jewish
achievement.”60 What prompts this change in Assmann’s position is the
second commandment, that is, the ban on graven images. In his earlier
work, the ban on graven images made little impression on Assmann,
as he focused almost entirely on Freud’s Egyptian hypothesis, but in
The Price of Monotheism, the ban plays the greater part in Assmann’s
reception of Freud: “With the ban on images, the distinction between
true and false in the divine world, and with it the distinction between
reason and madness, enters religion for the first time.”61 According to
Assmann, the second commandment does more than introduce intellectuality into the world; more importantly, it simultaneously identifies idolatry as a false form of religion. “Each and every image…bears
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within it the potential to be worshipped as a god,” Assmann explains.62
“This,” he goes on, “would necessarily be an ‘other god,’ since the true
god cannot be depicted.”63 Thus by outlawing the making of images,
Assmann argues, Moses was, in some definitive way, rejecting all other
gods as false gods.
I must admit, there is a certain logic to Assmann’s account.
Intellectuality and sensuality, as Bernstein has reminded us, do indeed
form a dualism in Freud.64 Moreover, sensuality is always portrayed
as the baser member of the dualism—in Freud’s words, it is “lower
psychical activity”65—while intellectuality appears as the nobler member, trading in “ideas, memories, and inferences,”66 which can give the
impression that Freud is simply describing the true-false binary in other terms.
However, I must quarrel with Assmann’s characterization of
Freud’s project, for, though intellectuality and sensuality do indeed
form a dualism in Freud, he never uses these terms as shorthand or
synonyms for monotheism and polytheism or, even less, truth and
falsehood itself. Quite the contrary, Freud always uses these categories
to describe different aspects of both monotheism and polytheism. For
example, as I have argued above, Freud does not present monotheism
as a purely intellectual theological system. Rather, he presents it as a
framework that is internally divided, possessing both intellectual and
sensual elements—a division, I might add, that brings monotheism in
closer proximity to polytheism by revealing their mutual affinity for
sensuality. As well, with polytheism, Freud finds the presence of both
sensual and intellectual tendencies: sensuality in the wide variety of
idols and personifications of the divine, and intellectuality in Ma ‘at,
which is not a personification at all, but an abstraction of truth and
justice. Thus to describe Freud’s concept of polytheism as an exclusively sensual and therefore false form of theology is dubious at best.
Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case, as Freud not only complicates how intellectuality and sensuality operates across both monotheism and polytheism, but he even opens up new lines of exchange
between the two of them, citing Ma ‘at, for instance, as an important
idea that monotheism imported from polytheism. And this, I believe,
is the overall aim of Freud’s project: not to reinscribe the true-false distinction, much less to present this distinction as a Jewish achievement,
as Assmann suggests, but to trouble and complicate the binaries that
we create in order to distinguish self and other and to draw our attention to the porousness of the borders and walls we erect in an attempt
to separate our truth from the other’s falsehood, a porousness that will
allow for flows and exchanges (and perhaps an entire economy) to
occur between self and other.
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Nowhere is Freud’s use of this dualism to complicate binaries on better
display than in his account of the origins of the Jewish people. When
Freud reconstructs these origins, a curious inconsistency (yet another
one of those textual distortions) emerges. At times, Freud will refer
to the people who left Egypt with Moses in the Exodus as Jews. But,
then, at other times, Freud will refer to these exact same people, not as
Jews, much less as Hebrews or Israelites, but very precisely as “NeoEgyptians,”67 even stating his preference for this term. What is the reason for this discrepancy? It would be very easy to overlook this inconsistency or to explain it away simply as an error of language (i.e. Freud
really means Jews when he writes Neo-Egyptians, and so on), but to do
so, would be a mistake, as this explanation would miss Freud’s larger
point about the specific composition of the Jews as a political entity.68 If
Freud wants to call the people of the Exodus Neo-Egyptians, and not
Jews, it is because he wants to draw attention to the composite nature
of the Jews as a political entity. Freud will refer to the Neo-Egyptians
as Jews from time to time because they do, in his account, form one
part of what will eventually become the Jews. But, in his account, they
do not become the Jews until they join a band of tribes living in “the
stretch of country between Egypt and Canaan.”69
Special attention must be paid to this union, and in particular to
the precise identity of these tribes with whom the Neo-Egyptians united, as these details play a decisive part in Freud’s theory of the Jews.
These tribes worshipped a common god, named Yahweh. “Yahweh,”
Freud tells us, “was unquestionably a volcano god,” “an uncanny,
bloodthirsty demon who went about by night and shunned the light
of day.”70 Such a description is indeed unflattering, but more importantly, it is a far cry from the God of Moses, whom Freud describes as
an abstraction that is “all-loving” and “all-powerful,” “averse to all
ceremonial and magic” and a promoter of “a life in truth and justice.”71
That is to say, whereas the Neo-Egyptians had, by this time, experienced the advance of intellectuality, and thus began following intellectual religion, the tribes with whom they united were still encaged
within a sensual theological framework. Thus, not only are the Jews, in
Freud’s account, a nation that “arose out of a union of two component
parts,”72 but their union brought together (without synthesis) the two
sides of the religious dualism, the intellectual and the sensual.
As should now be abundantly clear, the Jews, as well as Judaism,
in Freud, never come to embody the whole truth, nor are they ever
used to claim the true-false distinction as a profoundly Jewish project,
as they do in Assmann, because the Jews, in Freud, are not a whole
people in the first place, comprised fully of intellectual monotheists.
Rather, as Edward Said has put it, the Jews are “Freud’s profound
exemplification of the insight that even for the most definable, the
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most identifiable, the most stubborn communal identity…there are
inherent limits that prevent it from being fully incorporated into one,
and only one, Identity.”73
Care must be taken, however, so that Said (and Freud) is not misunderstood as suggesting that the Yahwehists somehow obstruct the
Jews from forming one, and only one, Identity, as if such a thing as
wholeness or purity were ever possible at all in the first place. The
Yahwehists, in Freud’s account, are not a foreign body that has become
parasitically attached to the Jews, contaminating them with a foreign,
and false, form of worship. Rather, Freud presents them as a constitutive
part of the Jews as such. In other words, the Jews are the Jews precisely
because they are “a union of two component parts,”74 that is, a union of
the sensual Yahwehists and the intellectual Neo-Egyptians. That is to
say, if the Jews do not form one, and only one, Identity, if they are not a
whole people, it is because they are constitutively so—equivocity is an
inherent part of their composition. Or, to put it in yet a different, albeit
paradoxical, fashion: the Jews’ non-Identity is their Identity.
The fact that Freud imagines the Jews as bringing together intellectual and sensual religion without effecting their synthesis—that is,
without absorbing these opposites into a third homogenous term—
does not mean that he paints an idyllic picture of Jewish communal life.
Indeed, the exact opposite is the case: Freud presents Jewish history as
a series of antagonistic and tumultuous events, whether that is one
side attempting to erase the foreign character of the other, the people
forgetting their Mosaic commitments and the prophets emerging to
call them back to those commitments, or the priesthood tendentiously
rewriting Jewish history in order to fabricate a homogenous heritage.
It means, rather, that life takes place in the midst of these differences
and antagonisms. That is to say, communal life is possible because of
constitutive equivocity, not in spite of it. The differences within a community do not prevent utopia, the other’s foreignness does not prevent
the people’s wholeness; rather, it is the exact opposite: these differences, this foreignness, is precisely the stuff of life itself.
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